Simulation: War on the Korean Peninsula

Although North Korea has openly defied the United Nations' weapons inspectors and has admitting having a secret nuclear weapons program, the Bush administration has made it clear it has no intention of subjecting the communist nation to the kind of military action it is considering against Iraq.

Critics have asked why war against North Korea is not an option for the United States. A Nightline "war game" — in which teams of experts took sides, one team playing the United States, the other North Korea — found that military action on the Korean peninsula could quickly escalate into a full-blown war, with North Korean shells and missiles inflicting massive damage on South Korea and the American troops there, possibly forcing the United States to respond with tactical nuclear weapons.

One of the experts predicted a "symphony of death," with hundreds of thousands or even millions of casualties.

Nightline asked two experts to represent the United States military: retired Lt. Gen. Terry Scott, who commanded the Army's 2nd Infantry Division in South Korea in the early 1990s; and Kurt Campbell, who managed the U.S. military's relationship with North and South Korea during the Clinton administration, as deputy assistant secretary of defense for Asian and Pacific affairs.

Taking the role of the North Korean regime were two professors at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service: retired Col. Bill Taylor, one of the few Americans to have met with former North Korean President Kim Il-Sung; and Victor Cha, a specialist in Asian affairs who is also an independent consultant to the Department of Defense.

The war game was a simplified exercise intended to sketch out possible scenarios. It did not take into account numerous potentially important factors, including for instance the views of the United States' South Korean or Japanese allies.

U.S. Options: Pinpoint Attacks, Then All-Out War

Nightline first asked Scott and Campbell to present the best military options the United States could use against North Korea.

Campbell recommended moving "initial forces" into the region, then launching pinpoint attacks on specific targets — such as plants where North Korea could turn plutonium into nuclear weapons — and immediately turning to North Korea and the international community for a diplomatic resolution that would prevent further hostilities. The U.S. military, he said, should be prepared to respond if the North Koreans chose to escalate hostilities. "It's a high-risk strategy, but among a lot of bad options, it's probably the best military option," he said.

Gen. Scott was less confident of the possibility of a diplomatic solution. "I recommend you prepare for all-out war, because that is what you're probably going to get," he said. An all-out strike on North Korea would have the following priorities, he said:

1. Eliminating North Korean weapons of mass destruction (WMD) — nuclear, chemical and biological — so they could not be used in retaliation against U.S. and South Korea forces. 2. Doing as much damage as possible to North Korea's conventional military machine, especially its artillery, to reduce the damage it could do to the South Korean capital, Seoul, and the surrounding area. 3. "Decapitating" the regime by stopping North Korean leader Kim Jong-Il from communicating with his forces in the field (WMD and conventional).

Preparing for such an attack would entail amassing naval carrier groups in the area — which would take a minimum of 30 days — and transferring land-based aircraft to bases in South Korea and Japan, according to Scott.

Campbell cautioned that even after a large-scale attack, "the North Koreans will still possess tremendous capabilities to respond and destroy Seoul." Scott said the best thing would be if the North Koreans moved first, "because then they move out of their positions and we have configured our military for years to fight a defensive battle for South Korea."

North Korea Response: Diplomacy or Provocation

Next, Nightline asked Taylor and Cha how North Korea might respond to a massive buildup of U.S. ships and war planes in the region, and the threat of attack in the event of any suspicious plutonium movements.

Taylor said the North Korean regime's first reaction would be diplomatic: to ask its historical allies China and Russia to put pressure on the United States to back off from unilateral military action. He suggested China could heighten its military readiness across the sea from Taiwan.

Cha said the North Koreans would likely match the U.S. mobilization, saying they were doing so in response to the Americans. Then, he said, judging from "North Korean negotiating behavior" in the past, the North would call the Americans' bluff and move some plutonium to escalate tension and "put the ball back in the United States' court."

Attack Across the DMZ

Assuming that the United States responded to the plutonium movement with pinpoint attacks on one or more of its nuclear facilities, Taylor said North Korea would respond with "overwhelming strikes," using long-range artillery and multiple-rocket launchers armed with chemical and biological weapons to turn Seoul into what the official North Korean media have been calling "a sea of fire."

Taylor said the North Koreans, believing the Americans would not tolerate high losses, would aim to immediately "give them large numbers of casualties like they've never seen before."

Cha agreed that North Korea, if attacked by U.S. strikes, would respond with a massive artillery attack on Seoul. "The way the balance of forces are on the Korean peninsula, the North Koreans are in a 'use or lose' situation. In other words, they have to use them first or they're going to lose them in battle," he said. He also said the North Koreans might try to stop the flow of U.S. reinforcements by using long-range missiles to knock out U.S. facilities in Japan.

Possibility of U.S. Nuclear Attack Seen

If North Korea waged an all-out attack on the South, Scott said it would be "a war the likes of which we haven't seen since World War II, if then." North Korea has a substantial air force and an army of more than one million men, with reserves of about four and a half million.

If the North Koreans used biological and chemical weapons against U.S. troops or South Korean targets, Scott said he would advise the U.S. president to respond with tactical nuclear weapons, provided there were suitable targets. Campbell said he would recommend a last-minute diplomatic appeal to China and Russia before using nuclear weapons.

Would the North Back Down?

Faced with the prospect of a U.S. tactical nuclear attack, Taylor predicted that the North Korean regime would realize it was facing its demise and ask Russia and China to help negotiate a cease-fire. "I think there would be another armistice of some sort to end what would look like a holocaust, for crying out loud," he said.

All of the experts predicted that the United States and its allies would defeat North Korea militarily. "We will win the war, but it will not be an easy war to fight," said Campbell. He said the first couple of weeks of war could be "a horrific symphony of death," with hundreds of thousands — if not millions — of casualties.

Taylor estimated that around 500,000 South Korean troops and civilians would die in the event of an all-out war with the North, as well as tens of thousands of U.S. troops. On the North Korean side, he said the casualties could be as high as a million and half dead.

Nightline asked a fifth expert, a former analyst with the Defense Intelligence Agency, with 20 years' experience on the Korean peninsula, to comment on the outcome of the war game. He firmly believed that China would not stand by, but enter the conflict on the North Korean side. And he said the casualties from a North Korean attack over the DMZ would be much higher, with closer to five million South Koreans and Americans dead in the first few days.

This report originally aired on Nightline Jan. 10, 2003.

N Korea Military Tactics
In A War With USA Strategy Of Massive
Retaliations Against US Attacks
By Han Ho Suk
Director Center for Korean Affairs
4-24-3 

North Korea has not only the military power but also the political will to wage total war against the United States. (An English abstract of a paper)   1. North Korea Can Engage the US in Total War   North Korea is one of the few nations that can engage in a total war with the United States. The US war planners recognize this fact. For example, on March 7, 2000, Gen. Thomas A Schwartz, the US commander in Korea at the time, testified at a US congressional hearing that "North Korea is the country most likely to involve the United States in a large-scale war."   North Korea, which can and is willing to face up to the sole military superpower of the world, cannot be called a weak nation. Nevertheless, Western press and analysts distort the truth and depict North Korea as an "impoverished" nation, starving and on the brink of imminent collapse. An impoverished, starving nation cannot face down a military superpower. Today few nations have military assets strong enough to challenge the US military. Russia, though weakened by the collapse of the Soviet Union, has enough assets to face up to the US. China, somewhat weaker than Russia, too, has strong military that can challenge the US. However, both Russia and China lack the political will to face down the US.   In contrast, North Korea has not only the military power but also the political will to wage total war against the United States. North Korea has made it clear that it will strike all US targets with all means, if the US mounted military attacks on North Korea. That North Korea's threat is no bluff can be seen from the aggressive actions taken by North Korea since the Korean War armistice, most recent of which is North Korea's attempt to capture an American spy plane. In the morning of March 1, 2003, an American RC-132S spy plane, Cobra Ball, took off from a US airbase in Okinawa, and cruised along the East coast of North Korea collecting electronic signals. The US intelligence suspected that North Korea was about to test a long-range missile and the plane was there to monitor the suspected missile launch.   When the US plane reached a point about 193 km from the coast of North Korea, two MiG-29 and two MiG-21 fighter planes showed up unexpectedly. The North Korean planes approached within 16 m and signaled the US plane to follow them. The US pilot refused to follow the command and left the scene posthaste. The US plane was tailed by the hostiles for about 22 min but let the US spy plane go. There are two key points to be observed here.   First, the hostile planes waited for the US plane at the Uhrang airbase, located about 200 km from the point of air encounter. They knew that the US plane was coming. The North Korean planes flew 200 km to intercept the US plane. Did the US plane see them coming? If it did, why no evasive action? After intercepting the US plane, the hostile planes dogged it for 22 min. Why no American planes for the rescue? The US crew must have informed the base of the danger they were in, but no action was taken by the base. If Kim Jong Il had given the command, the MiGs would have shot down the US plane and returned to their base before the US could have scrambled war planes.   Second, North Korea intercepted an American spy plane flying 200 km from its coast. According to the international norm, a nation's territorial air space extends 19 km from its coast line. The US is the exception and claims air space of 370 km from its coast line; any foreign airplane violating this extended air space is challenged or shot down by the US military.   2. North Korea's Massive Retaliation Strategy   North Korea's war plan in case of an US attack is total war, not the 'low-intensity limited warfare' or 'regional conflict' talked about among the Western analysts. North Korea will mount a total war if attacked by the US. There are three aspects to this war plan.   First, total war is North Korea's avowed strategy in case of US preemptive attacks. The US war on Iraq shows that the US can and will mount preemptive strikes in clear violation of international laws, and the United Nations is powerless to stop the US. Any nation that is weak militarily may be attacked by the US at will. It is reasonable for North Korea to deter US attacks with threats of total war.   Second, North Korea expects no help from China, Russia, or other nations in case of war with the US. It knows that it will be fighting the superpower alone. Nominally, China and Russia are North Korea's allies but neither ally is expected to provide any assistance to North Korea in case of war. Neither nation can or is willing to protect North Korea from attacks by the US, and North Korea alone can and will protect itself from US attacks. This principle of self-defense applies to all nations.   Third, North Korea's total war plan has two components: massive conventional warfare and weapons of mass destruction. If the US mounts a preemptive strike on North Korea's Yongbyon nuclear plants, North Korea will retaliate with weapons of mass destruction: North Korea will mount strategic nuclear attacks on the US targets. The US war planners know this and have drawn up their own nuclear war plan. In a nuclear exchange, there is no front or rear areas, no defensive positions or attack formations as in conventional warfare. Nuclear weapons are offensive weapons and there is no defense against nuclear attacks except retaliatory nuclear attacks. For this reason, North Korea's war plan is offensive in nature: North Korea's war plan goes beyond repulsing US attackers and calls for destruction of the United States.   The US war plan '5027' calls for military occupation of North Korea; it goes beyond the elimination of North Korea's weapons of mass destruction. The US military regards North Korea its main enemy and likewise North Korea regards the US its main enemy. South Korea, too, regards North Korea its main enemy but North Korea does not regard South Korea its main enemy because South Korea is a client state of the United States and has no ability or power to act independent of the US. North Korea's war plan is not for invading South Korea but for destroying the US.   3. North Korea's Military Capability   All nations keep their military capability secret. North Korea is no exception and it is not easy to assess North Korea's military power. The US claims that it knows North Korea's military secrets. The United States collects intelligence on North Korea using a variety of means: American U-2, RC-135, EP-3 and other high-altitude spy planes watch over North Korea 24 hours 7 days a week. The US 5th Air Reconnaissance Squadron has U-2R, U-2S, and other advanced spy planes at the Ohsan airbase in South Korea. In addition, the US has 70 KH-11 spy satellites hovering over North Korea.   In spite of such a massive deployment of intelligence collection assets, the US intelligence on North Korea is faulty at best. Donald Gregg, a former US ambassador to Seoul and a 30-year CIA veteran, has admitted that the US intelligence on North Korea has been the longest lasting story of failure in the annals of US intelligence. Gregg said that even the best spy gadget in the US arsenal cannot read what's on Kim Jong Il's mind. US Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld said that North Korea uses underground optical fibers for military communication and that it is nearly impossible to plant human agents in North Korea.   Although North Korea's military secrets are impervious to US spy operations, one can draw some general pictures from information available in the public domain.   a) North Korea makes its own weapons   North Korea has annual production capacity for 200,000 AK automatic guns, 3,000 heavy guns, 200 battle tanks, 400 armored cars and amphibious crafts. North Korea makes its own submarines, landing drafts, high-speed missile-boats, and other types of warships. Home-made weaponry makes it possible for North Korea to maintain a large military force on a shoestring budget. North Korea defense industry is made of three groups: weapon production, production of military supplies, and military-civilian dual-use product manufacturing.   North Korea has 17 plants for guns and artillery, 35 plants for ammunition, 5 plants for tanks and armored cars, 8 plants for airplanes, 5 plants for warships, 3 plants for guided missiles, 5 plants for communication equipment, and 8 plants for biochemical warheads - 134 plants in total. In addition, many plants that make consumer products are designed so that they can be made to produce military items with minimum modification. About 180 of defense related plants are built underground in the rugged mountainous areas of Jagang-do. Several small to medium hydro-power plants serve these plants so that it would be nearly impossible for the US to cut off power to the plants.   b) North Korea has its own war plans   North Korea is mountainous and its coasts are long and jagged. The Korean peninsula is narrow on its waste. North Korea's weapons and war tactics are germane to Korea's unique geography. North Korea has developed its own war plans unique to fighting the US in a unique way. North Korea's military is organized into several independent, totally integrated and self-sufficient fighting units, that are ready for action at any time.   c) North Korean soldiers are well indoctrinated   The US commanders admit that North Korean soldiers are highly motivated and loyal to Kim Jong Il, and that they will fight well in case of war. Karl von Clausewitz said that people's support for war, military commanders' ability and power, and the political leadership are the three essentials for winning war. He failed to include the political indoctrination of the soldiers, which is perhaps more important than the other factors cited.   During the Iraq War just ended, the main cause of Iraq's defeat was the low moral of its soldiers. Iraqi soldiers had no will to stand and fight, and they ran away or surrendered without fight. Iraqi soldiers believed in Allah protecting them and became easy preys to the US military. North Korean soldiers are taught to fight to the bitter end. In September 1996, a North Korean submarine got stranded at Kangrung, South Korea, and its crew abandoned the ship. Eleven of the crew committed suicide and the rest fought to the last man except one who was captured. In June 1998, another submarine got caught in fishing nets at Sokcho and its crew killed themselves. Such is the fighting spirit of North Korean soldiers.   d) North Koreans are combat ready   One cannot fight war without military preparedness. North Korea's regular army is for offensive actions whereas its militias are homeland defense. North Korea's regular army consists of 4 corps in the front area, 8 corps in the rear area, one tank corps, 5 armored corps, 2 artillery corps, and 1 corps for the defense of Pyongyang, South Korea has 19 infantry divisions whereas North Korea has 80 divisions and brigades.   A North Korean infantry division has 3 infantry regiments, 1 artillery regiment (3 battalions of 122 mm rocket launchers and 1 battalion of 152 mortars), one tank battalion of 31 tanks, one anti-tank battalion, one anti-aircraft battalion, one engineer battalion, one communication battalion, one light-infantry battalion, one recon battalion, and one chemical warfare battalion.   North Korea's militias consist of 1.6 million self-defense units, 100,000 people's guards, 3.9 million workers militia, 900,000 youth guard units. These militias are tasked to defend the homeland. The militias are fully armed and undergo military trainings regularly.   i) Artillery   North Korea has 2 artillery corps and 30 artillery brigades equipped with 120mm self-propelled guns, 152mm self-propelled mortars, 170mm guns with a range of 50 km, 240 mm multiple rocket launchers with a range of 45 km, and other heavy guns. North Korea has about 18,000 heavy guns. North Korea's 170mm Goksan gun and 240mm multiple-tube rocket launchers are the most powerful guns of the world. These guns can lob shells as far south as Suwon miles beyond Seoul. The big guns are hidden in caves. Many of them are mounted on rails and can fire in all directions. They can rain 500,000 conventional and biochemical shells per hour on US troops near the DMZ. The US army bases at Yijong-bu, Paju, Yon-chun, Munsan, Ding-gu-chun, and Pochun will be obliterated in a matter of hours.   The US army in Korea is equipped with Paladin anti-artillery guns that can trace enemy shells back to the guns and fire shells at the enemy guns with pin-point accuracy. However, it takes for the Paladins about 10 min to locate the enemy guns, during which time the Paladins would be targeted by the enemy guns Gen. Thomas A Schwartz, a former US army commander in Korea, stated that the US army in Korea would be destroyed in less than three hours.   ii). Blitz Klieg   North Korea has tanks, armored cars, and self-propelled artillery for blitz klieg. North Korea has one tank corps and 15 tank brigades. The tank corps has 5 tank regiments, each of which has 4 heavy tank battalions, 1 light-tank battalion, one mechanized infantry battalion, 2 self-propelled artillery battalions.   US tanks are designed to operate in open fields. In 1941, Rommel of Germany defeated British troops in North Africa with tanks. The largest tank battle was fought at Kursk in 1943, in which the Soviets defeated Germans. In 1973, Egypt defeated Israeli tanks with anti-tank missiles. All of these tank battles were fought in open fields. The Gulf War and the recent war in Iraq saw US tanks in open fields. American and Western tank commanders do not know how to fight tank battles in rugged terrains like those of Korea. Tank battles in Korea will be fought on hilly terrains without any close air cover, because North Korean fighters will engage US planes in close dog fights.   North Korea has developed tanks ideally suited for the many rivers and mountains of Korea. These tanks are called "Chun-ma-ho", which can navigate steep slopes and cross rivers as much as 5.5 m deep. North Korea's main battle tanks - T-62s - have 155 mm guns and can travel as fast as 60 km per hour. The US main tanks - M1A - have 120 mm guns and cannot travel faster than 55 km per hour. North Korean tanks have skins 700 mm thick and TOW-II is the only anti-tank missile in the US arsenal that can penetrate this armored skin.   North Korea began to make anti-tank missiles in 1975 and has been improving its anti-tank missiles for the past 30 years. North Korea's anti-tank missiles are rated the best in the world and several foreign nations buy them. The US army in Korea relies on 72 AH-64 Apache attack helicopters to kill North Korean tanks. Each Apache has 16 Hell-Fire anti-tank missiles. As shown in the recent Iraq war, Apaches are fragile and can be easily shot down even with rifles. North Korea has about 15,000 shoulder-fired anti-air missiles ("wha-sung") and Apaches will be easy targets for wha-sung missiles. On December 17, 1994, a wha-sung missile brought down an American OH-58C spy helicopter which strayed north of the DMZ.   North Korea has 4 mechanized corps and 24 mechanized brigades. Each brigade has 1 tank battalion (31 tanks), 1 armored battalion (46 armored cars), 4 infantry battalions, one 122mm battalion (18 guns), one 152 mm battalion (18 guns), one anti-aircraft battalion (18 guns), anti-tank battalion (9 armored cars with anti-tank missiles and 12 anti-tank guns), one armored recon company (3 light armored cars, 7 armored cars, and 8 motor-cycles), one mortar company (6 mortars), one engineer company, one chemical company, and one communication company. The US army has A-10 attack planes to counter North Korea's mechanized units. In case of war, the skies over Korea will be filled with fighters in close dog-fights and the A-10s would be ineffective.   The bulk of North Korea's mechanized and tank units are positioned to cross the DMZ at a moment's notice and run over the US and South Korean defenders. The attackers will be aided by SU-25 attack planes and attack helicopters. In addition, North Korea has 600 high-speed landing crafts, 140 hovercrafts, and 3,000 K-60 and other pontoon bridges for river-crossing. North Korea has 700,000 troops, 8,000 heavy guns, and 2,000 tanks placed in more than 4,000 hardened bunkers within 150 km of the DMZ.   iii. Underground Tunnel Warfare   North Korea is the world most-tunneled nation. North Korea's expertise in digging tunnels for warfare was demonstrated during the Vietnam War. North Korea sent about 100 tunnel warfare experts to Vietnam to help dig the 250 km tunnels for the North Vietnamese and Viet Gong troops in South Vietnam. The tunnels were instrumental in the Vietnamese victory.   North Korea's army runs on company-size units. Tunnel warfare is conducted by independent company-size units. Tunnel entrances are built to withstand US chemical and biological attacks. Tunnels run zig-zag and have seals, air-purification units, and safe places for the troops to rest. It is believed that North Korea has built about 20 large tunnels near the DMZ. A large tunnel can transport 15,000 troops per hour across the DMZ and place them behind the US troops.   iv. Special Forces   North Korea has the largest special forces, 120,000 troops, in the world. These troops are grouped into light infantry brigades, attack brigades, air-borne brigades, and sea-born brigades - 25 brigades in total. These troops will be tasked to attack US military installations in Korea, Japan, Okinawa and Guam.   North Korea has the capacity to transport 20,000 special force troops at the same time. North Korea has 130 high-speed landing crafts and 140 hovercrafts. A North Korean hovercraft can carry one platoon of troops at 90 km per hour. Western experts pooh-pooh North Korea's ancient AN-2 transport planes as 1948 relics, but AN-2 planes can fly low beneath US radars and deliver up to 10 troops at 160 km per hour. North Korea makes AN-2s and has about 300 in place. In addition, North Korea has hang-gliders that can carry 5-20 men each for short hops.   North Korea has developed special bikes for mountain warfare. Special forces use these bikes for fast deployments on mountains. Switzerland is the only other nation that has bike-mounted special forces trained for mountain warfare. The rugged terrains of the Korean Peninsula are ideally suited for special forces operations. North Korea's special forces will attack US targets in Japan, Okinawa, and Guam as well. Japan's self defense units are being reorganized to counter this threat.   How good are North Korea's special forces? In September 1996, a North Korean submarine was stranded near Kang-nung and the crew were forced to abandon the ship and land on South Korea. The sub had two special forces agents who had finished a mission in South Korea and were picked up by the sub before the sub ran into a rock. The two men fought off an army of South Korean troops and remained at large for 50 days, during which they killed 11 of the pursuers.   4. Weapons of Mass Destruction   a. Missile Readiness   North Korea is a nuclear state along with the US, Russia, China, the Great Britain, France, India, Pakistan, and Israel. North Korea has succeeded in weaponizing nuclear devices for missile delivery. North Korea has operational fleets of ICBM and intermediate-range missiles equipped with nuclear warheads. I have written on this subject previously and will not replicate the details here.   It was May of 1994, nine years ago, when the US military planners had first realized that North Korea had the bomb and devised nuclear attack plans under William Perry, the then US Secretary of Defense. Perry had estimated that North Korea would have about 100 nuclear warheads by 2000. Dr. Kim Myong Chul, an expert on Kim Jong Il's war plans, has recently confirmed that North Korea has more than 100 nukes including hydrogen bombs.   North Korea can produce about 100 missiles a year. It began to make missiles in 1980 and has about 1,000 missiles of various types in place, about 100 of which have nuclear warheads. These missiles are hidden in caves and underground launching pads. At present, the US has no fool-proof defense against North Korean missiles, and in case of war, North Korean missiles can do serious damages: several hundreds of thousands of US troops will die, and scores of US bases and carrier battle groups will be destroyed. The Patriot anti-missile missiles are deployed in South Korea but as shown in the recent Iraq war, the Patriots are not 100% accurate or reliable even under ideal conditions.   b. Biochemical Warfare   North Korea has a large stockpile of biochemical weapons. Each Army corps has a chemical company and each regiment has a chemical platoon. In the May 1994 nuclear crisis, Perry warned North Korea that the US would retaliate with nuclear weapons if North Korea used chemical weapons on US troops.   North Korean troops and citizens are well-prepared for bio-chemical attacks.   5. North Korea's Defense Against US Attacks   a. Fortification   North Korea began to build fortifications in 1960s. All key military facilities are built underground to withstand American bunker-buster bombs. North Korea has 8,236 underground facilities that are linked by 547 km of tunnels. Beneath Pyongyang are a huge underground stadium and other facilities. About 1.2 million tons of food, 1.46 million tons of fuel, and 1.67 million tons of ammunition are stored in underground storage areas for wartime use.   Most of the underground facilities are drilled into granite rocks and the entrances face north in order to avoid direct hits by American bombs and missiles. The B-61 Mod 11 is the main bunker buster in the US arsenal. A recent test showed that this buster could penetrate only 6 meters of rock. The latest GBU-28 laser-guided bunker-buster can penetrate to 30m. North Korean bunkers have at least 80 m of top-cover of solid rocks. North Korea has many false caves that emit heats that will misdirect unwary GBU-28/37 and BKU-113 bunker-busters.   The US military targets enemy command and control centers based on the doctrine of chopping off "the head of the snake." With the top commanders eliminated, the rank and file would be demoralized, leaderless and would surrender. North Korea's extensive underground fortification makes this strategy unworkable. In addition, the underground facilities make US spy planes and satellites impotent.   b. Air Defense   North Korea has a large number of ground-to-air missiles. It has SA-2 and SA-3 missiles against low-flying enemy planes, and SA-5 missiles for high-altitude planes. SA-5 missiles have an effective range of 250 km. SA-5 missiles can hit enemy planes flying over the middle of South Korea.   North Korea has reengineered US shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles captured in Vietnam, and designed its own missile, wha-sung. North Korea began to manufacture wha-sung missiles in 1980. Wha-sung comes in two models: SA-7 that has an effective range of 5 km and SA-16 with 10 km range. North Korea has more than 15,000 wha-sung missiles in place.   In addition to the missiles, North Korea has 12,000 anti-aircraft guns, including 37mm twin-barrel guns, 23 mm automatics, 57mm, 87mm, and 100mm heavy guns. These are mostly manually operated and thus not subject to electronic warfare.   c. Coastal deferens.   North Korea's coastlines are long and jagged. Coastal guns are placed in fortified tunnels along the coastline. North Korea has six ground-to-ship missile bases. North Korea has anti-ship missiles of 95km range, and of 160km range. The latter are for hitting US carrier battle groups over the horizon. North Korean anti-ship missiles can hit ships anchored at Inchon on the west and Sokcho on the east.   America's main defense against anti-ship missiles, the Arleigh Burke class Aegis destroyers are ineffective outside 20-50 km from missile launch pads.   d. Sea Battles   North Korea has two fleets - the West Fleet and the East Fleet. The West Fleet has 6 squadrons of 320 ships and the East Fleet has 10 squadron of 460 ships. The navy has a total manpower of 46,000. North Korean ships are sheltered from US attacks in about 20 bunkers of 200-900 m longs and 14-22 m wide. North Korean ships are small and agile, designed for coastal defense. North Korean ships carry 46km range ship-to-ship missiles and 22-channel multiple rocket launchers.   The main enemy of the North Korean navy will be US carrier task forces. The Russian navy has developed a tactic to deal with US carriers task forces: massive simultaneous missile attacks. In addition, Russia has developed the anti-carrier missile, "jun-gal", that can destroy a carrier. China has developed similar tactics for destroying US carriers. On April 1, 2003, North Korea test-fired a high-speed ground-to-ship missile of 60km range. A US carrier task force of Nimitz class has 6,000 men, 70 planes, and a price tag of 4.5 billion dollars. Destroying even a single career task force will be traumatic.   A carrier is protected by a shield of 6 Aegis destroyers and nuclear attack submarines. An Aegis destroyer has an AN/SPY-1 high-capacity radar system that can track more than 100 targets at the same time. An Aegis can fire about 20 anti-missile missiles at the same time. Thus, a career force can track a total of 600 targets at a time and fire 120 anti-missile missiles at the same time. The anti-missile missiles have about 50% success under ideal conditions. In actual battle situations, the hit rate will be much lower and the best estimate is that the Aegis shield can intercept at most 55 incoming missiles. Therefore, a volley of about 60 missiles and rockets will penetrate the Aegis shield and hit the career.   North Korea acquired OSA and KOMAR high-speed missile boats in 1968, and began to build its own missile boats in 1981. It has more than 50 missile boats, each equipped with 4 missiles of 46km range and multiple rocket launchers. In addition, North Korea has about 300 speed boats, 200 torpedo boats and 170 other gunboats. In case of war, North Korea's small crafts and submarines will swarm around US career task forces and destroy them.   North Korea has 35 submarines and 65 submersibles. These crafts are equipped with torpedoes and will be used to attack US careers. They will also lay mines and block enemy harbors. North Korea has a large supply of mines. North Korean submarines are small but they are equipped with 8km rocket launchers and 70km anti-ship missiles, and they could do some serious damage to US careers..   e. Air Combats   North Korea has three air commands. Each command has a fighter regiment, a bomber regiment, an AN-2 regiment, an attack helicopter regiment, a missile regiment, and a radar regiment. Each command can operate independently. North Korea has 70 airbases, which are fortified against US attacks. Underground hangars protect the planes and have multiple exits for the planes to take off on different runways. North Korea has several fake airfields and fake planes to confuse US attackers.   It is said that North Korea's planes are obsolete and no match for US planes. North Korea has 770 fighters, 80 bombers, 700 transports, 290 helicopters, and 84,000 men. In case of war, North Korean planes will fly low hugging the rugged terrains and attack enemy targets. US planes are parked above ground at bases in Korea, Japan, Okinawa and Guam, and make easy targets for missile, rocket and air attacks. When war breaks out, North Korean missiles, rockets and heavy guns will destroy the 8 US airbases in South Korea, and any plane in the air would have no place to land.   North Korea's fighter planes are ill-equipped for air-to-air combats at long distances. but they can hold their own in close-quarter air combats. MiG-21 fighters from Bongchun and US F-15 from Ohsan would meet in less than 5 min, assuming they took off at about the same time. In about 5 min, hundreds of MiG21s and F-15s would be swirling in the skies over Korea. Ground-to-air missiles and air-to-air missiles would have hard time telling friends from foes. F-15Es are equipped with a radar system that lock on at 180 km for large objects and 90 km for small objects. Sidewinder missiles have an effective range of 16km, AMRAAM missiles of 50km, and Sparrow of 55km.   Korea is 100 km wide and 125 km long, and so US air-to-air missiles would be of limited use and effectiveness, because North Korean MiGs would approach the US planes in close proximity and commingle with US planes, and air-to-air missiles will become useless and machines guns will have to be used. MiG19s have 30mm guns, MiG21s have 23mm guns, and F-14s have 20mm Valkans. North Korean pilots are trained to hug the enemy planes so that air-to-air missiles cannot be used. In contrast, US pilots are trained to lock on the enemy at long distance with radar and fire missiles. US planes are heavily armed with electronics and less agile than the light, lean MiGs that can climb and turn faster than the US planes.   F-14s are about 3.3 times heavier than MiG21s, and F-150Es are about 3.6 times heavier. MiG21s are 16.6 m long whereas F-14s are 19.1 m and F-15Es 19.43 m long. MiG21s cab climb to 18km, whereas F-1A can climb to 15.8 km and F-16 to 15.2 km. MiGs get upper hands in close-range dogfights in which agility matters. In Vietnam, US planes were forced to jettison auxiliary gas tanks and bombs in order to engage MiGs. F-150 E planes will carry BLU-113 bunker busters that weigh 2,250 kg each in the next war in Korea. Loaded with such a heavy bomb, F-15s will become easy targets for North Korea's MiGs. US fighter-bombers will be protected by F-15C fighter escorts.   MiG21s are North Korea's main workhorse. The MiG21 debuted in 1965 in Vietnam and proved itself as an effective attack fighter. In 1999, North Korea bought 40 MiG21s from Kazakhstan. During the Vietnam War, MiG17s shot down dozens of American planes. North Korea sent more than 200 pilots to fight in the Vietnam War. They were tasked to defend Hanoi and shot down scores of US planes. North Korea sent 25 pilots to Syria during the 3rd Arab-Israeli war of 1966, and 30 pilots to Egypt and Syria during the 4th Arab-Israeli war of 1973. In 1976, North Korea sent more than 40 pilots to Syria.   f. Electronic Warfare   The United States excels in electronic warfare and no nation comes anywhere near the US capability. North Korea began developing its own electronic warfare methods in 1970. It is believed that North Korea has advanced electronic warfare ability. It has numerous counter measures for US electronic warfare. During the recent war in Iraq, the US dropped e-bombs that disabled the Iraqi electronic devices. North Korea relies heavily on non-electronic command and control means, and hence US e-bombs will have limited impacts in North Korea.   North Korea trains about 100 hackers a year and has computer virus battalions in place. These hackers are capable of interrupting US communication networks. In a war game conducted in 1991 by US war planners, North Korea came out the victor with and without nuclear weapons. Kim Jong Il has no doubt that his army can beat the US army.   6. US Military Defeats in the Past   Military power dictates the outcome of war. In assessing the next war in Korea, the military power of the opponents must be examined objectively. Until now, North Korea's military power has not been properly studied. In general, Western experts tend to underestimate North Korea's military strength. Politicians in America and South Korea play down North Korean threats for political reasons.   It has been said that North Korean army is large in numbers but their equipment are obsolete, and hence it is a weak army. The US war planners assess North Korean army using computer simulations of war in Korea. US war plan for the recent Iraq war was refined using more than 40 computer-simulated wars in Iraq. The computer simulation models use weapon system features among other factors to determine the outcome.   It is true that the advanced weapons were instrumental in the US victory in the Gulf War, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, and Iraq. On the other hand, the US army was defeated by ill-equipped foes in Korea and Vietnam. The latter two wars show that superior weapons do not always lead to a victory. North Korean and Chinese forces in Korea and the Vietnamese forces fought with superior tactics and stronger fighting fighting spirits.   In the next war in Korea, the US army will face an enemy much more determined and better equipped than the army in the Korean War of 1950-53.

Needle in a Haystack: How North Korea Could Fight a Nuclear War

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By Garth McLennan
13 June 2016

Since its January 6 test of what was claimed to be a hydrogen bomb and a follow-up satellite launch on February 7, North Korea’s nuclear weapons program has received a considerable amount of attention. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) unanimously passed Resolution 2270 at the beginning of March[1] in what has been widely viewed as one of the most sweeping sets of economic sanctions on Pyongyang to date. In addition, American officials have pressed their reluctant Chinese counterparts for greater cooperation in checking Pyongyang, South Korea closed down the Kaesong Industrial Zone it operates with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), and Washington has refocused attention on the possibility of deploying the Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system to the Republic of Korea (ROK).

Much less coverage and attention has been paid to how the North Korean leadership might actually use nuclear weapons in a live, operational setting. The avoidance of discussion on this issue is hardly surprising; analysis of nuclear combat theory and doctrine is somewhat of a taboo in the strategic community,[2] almost certainly borne of the ideas of mutually-assured-destruction (MAD) and measurements in megadeaths (a morbid metric defining nuclear combat deaths of at least one million) that were derived from the conclusions reached by Cold War thinkers and analysts.

However, this avoidance needs to change. Undoubtedly it is uncomfortable to contemplate scenarios involving violence on such a grand scale, but the reality is that the global nuclear weapons landscape has fundamentally changed in the quarter century since the Soviet Union crumbled, and has brought about a strategic environment in which it can no longer be assumed that such weapons will never be used. Topics of discussion related to nuclear weapons need to extend beyond nonproliferation or attempts at containing burgeoning powers on the hunt for the bomb.

More than a decade of punishing sanctions have thus far not had the desired effect on North Korean behavior and the new ones implemented in accordance with UNSCR Resolution 2270 are unlikely to be more effective. Kim Jong Un’s regime, like its predecessor, sees nuclear weapons as the ultimate guarantor of state survival. Taken from the perspective of a dictator, it isn’t difficult to imagine the Kim regime looking to the fate of toppled Libyan strongman Muammar Gaddafi, who cooperated with the United States on the surrender of his own WMD stockpiles yet was deposed and ultimately killed by opposition rebels backed by Washington in 2011, and opting for another course.[3]

This is just one example that helps explain the North Korean calculus. Since the imposition of the new Security Council sanctions and amid the near global condemnation that has followed its latest round of nuclear testing, Pyongyang has issued a steady stream of increasingly volatile and threatening statements, including a threat to launch nuclear strikes at New York.[4] After the additional sanctions were levied, the DPRK publicized that Kim had given the order for the nation’s nuclear forces to be put on high alert.[5] While such language is often treated as something of a joke among western audiences, talk of the sort emanating out of Pyongyang may signify that the DPRK leadership views its nuclear weapons as “inherently usable.”[6] At the Workers’ Party of Korea’s 7th Congress last month, Kim shed greater light on what sort of scenario could trigger a DPRK nuclear strike. He stated that North Korean sovereignty would have to be threatened by “invasive hostile forces with nuclear weapons.” Given the regime’s behavior, however, this should hardly be taken as gospel. Just what exactly would constitute a violation of DPRK sovereignty is unclear, as is how Pyongyang might classify the terms “hostile” and “invasive.”

In a sense, this is reminiscent of Russia’s “escalate to deescalate” concept – the nuclear posture Moscow adopted in the wake of NATO’s 1999 intervention in Yugoslavia. The doctrine essentially revolves around the premise that Russia reserves the option to execute a first-strike nuclear attack in a limited fashion against an opponent that has overwhelmed its conventional capacities, but it does not specify the kind of live setting that would fall within the doctrine’s framework. Unlike Russia, however, the North Korean nuclear posture is not particularly diversified. Asymmetric escalation options for the DPRK leadership are somewhat limited; North Korea has not concentrated on advanced tactical nuclear weapons and that in turn limits how it might actually fight a nuclear war.

At the same time, and against the backdrop of the largest ever joint US-ROK military exercises that took place throughout March, which were said to focus on Special Forces-led decapitation strikes aimed at the DPRK leadership,[7] North Korea also unveiled its new multiple launch rocket system (MLRS), not seen since Pyongyang’s military parade last October.[8] Although Pyongyang has not released any information pertaining to the system’s capabilities other than photos it is believed to be able to fire a number of rockets at one time, presenting challenging obstacles for anti-missile systems. Jeffrey Lewis has pointed out the similarities North Korea’s new MLRS’s rocket bears to the Pakistani Hatf-IX/Nasr 300mm rocket,[9] which Pakistan’s Strategic Plans Division has publicly said has the capability to be armed with nuclear warheads.[10]

Pyongyang has also made the notable shift to solid-fuelled submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) testing from its previous liquid-fuel designs. The last test, conducted in April, featured a range of just 30 km, after four failed tests.[11] This, along with an examination of the DPRK’s offensive nuclear posture, quite possibly sheds some light on North Korean strategy should conflict ever escalate to the nuclear sphere.

While the North has conducted four nuclear tests since 2006, the exact size of its arsenal is largely unknown, and it has not been yet proven to have a secure, second-strike retaliatory capability of the kind that acts as a lynchpin for larger nuclear powers. It does, however, possess large quantities of ballistic missiles, something the regime has been anything but shy in displaying of late. On March 9, Kim visited an unnamed factory, believed to be Chamjin Missile Factory near Pyongyang, where he posed behind what appeared to be a globe model of a miniaturized nuclear device.[12] Also included in the photograph were two KN-08 ballistic missiles, the as-yet-untested intercontinental-ballistic missile (ICBM) feared by some as being able to reach US shores. The accompanying release issued from North Korean state news agencies claimed that the DPRK had succeeded in mating miniaturized nuclear warheads to its ballistic missiles, which, if accurate, would represent a major breakthrough. On March 14, Kim publicly pondered future nuclear and missile tests, saying that North Korean scientists had deciphered how to shield a warhead mounted on a ballistic missile from the heat of re-entry.[13]

While the speed of North Korean nuclear advancements, and the persistent absence of independent or outside verification of such achievements, is certainly a cause for concern, a very large ballistic missile inventory of varying ranges, along with a much smaller but growing nuclear arsenal estimated to contain between 10-16 weapons[14] today appears likely. This raises the frightening possibility of so-called haystacking in the event of actual nuclear war.

In this scenario, Pyongyang would attempt to saturate a given battlefield with conventionally armed ballistic missiles; the catch comes in that a small number of these missiles would be armed with nuclear warheads. Such a strategy would greatly challenge American and South Korean missile defense networks while also comporting with the DPRK’s wider nuclear posture; in lieu of reliable intelligence as to which incoming missiles have nuclear capabilities and which do not, anti-missile batteries would be forced to shoot down as many as possible, greatly lowering the efficiency and effectiveness of any possible defense.

Such a dispersed strategy would address the serious deficiencies North Korea faces in opposition to advanced American and allied missile defense systems, but it would also result in efforts to stiffen those systems. Indeed, the near-constant talk surrounding the possible deployment of THAAD anti-missile batteries to South Korea already suggests such an endeavour is being openly contemplated, to the great annoyance of Beijing.[15] The THAAD system is built to defend against short and intermediate-ranged ballistic missiles.[16] And while the ROK already has formidable missile defense capabilities, including a large arsenal of Patriot-2 short-range missiles that are to be upgraded to the Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC-3s, the same kind recently installed on the home isles by Japan) interceptor sometime in the next year or two,[17] the addition of one or more THAAD units would no doubt provide South Korea with a more layered defensive posture.

THAAD would not, however, serve as an effective tool in countering a North Korean nuclear strike if such an attack were haystacked among a barrage of conventional warheads. The THAAD system is a powerful anti-missile tool, one that forms a central part of defending America’s military base in Guam, but in this case, it would not serve as a bulletproof measure against a North Korean nuclear attack. At present, such a system does not exist.

If THAAD were deployed to the Korean peninsula, it would hardly be a stretch for Pyongyang to immediately and aggressively increase their production of ballistic missiles and their assorted delivery systems. THAAD, for all it can do, has limits that can be overcome by high volume missile stockpiles and SLBM capabilities.[18]

The ROK’s current ability to counter a saturation-based ballistic missile attack from the DPRK is limited. The Patriot radars currently employed by South Korea have the ability to track between 40-50 incoming projectiles. The doctrine attached to missile interception calls for a two-to-one ratio for every missile fired; if Pyongyang were to launch a haystacked barrage, it would almost immediately tax Seoul’s capacity to repel it. At the same time, nuclear-armed ballistic missiles would almost certainly confront the ROK with the problem of leakage in any attempt to intercept them.

An unorthodox nuclear doctrine like haystacking may be the most suitable doctrinal framework for Pyongyang, but such an approach would greatly increase the risks of nuclear combat becoming a reality considering the close geographic proximity of Pyongyang to all of its likely enemies and the forward-deployed missile posture that results from that, it would not take too much of a stretch of the imagination to see that the number of nuclear-related crises could rise. Such an absence of distance could, as the DPRK has already alluded to, lead to higher states of alert and warning, less time to fully discern the nature of an incoming projectile and develop an appropriate response, and more devolved structures of command-and-control.[19]

The biggest takeaway from this developing scenario is a lowering of the nuclear threshold, where the chances of a triggering incident escalate dramatically. It also stands in stark contrast to the accepted strategic balance that existed throughout much of the Cold War. While truly terrifying moments in which both Washington and Moscow were pushed to the nuclear brink have occurred, they were relatively few and far between. Even if command of North Korea’s nuclear arsenal remains tightly controlled by the central leadership, the danger of a lowered threshold will increase. If command-and-control of nuclear assets are given to North Korean generals at or near the battlefield because of fears of decapitation, every incident of dispute could see its stakes raised immediately.

With a stated North Korean doctrine for the use of nuclear weapons that hardly inspires confidence for stability, an escalatory scenario could arise quickly if tensions ratchet up. This should not be viewed as impossible. Moreover, the expected continued growth of North Korea’s nuclear arsenal, both in terms of numbers and possibly sophistication, along with the possible expansion of its ballistic missile delivery force, will only heighten the danger. The contemplation of how Pyongyang could put its nuclear arsenal into action requires the realization that there is no magic-bullet solution to the problem while also thinking beyond early air-atomic theory and the horrors of MAD through scenario-based analysis that is fully cognizant of the above factors.

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[1] “Adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 2270 on North Korea,” U.S. Department of State, March 2, 2016, accessed June 13, 2016, http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2016/03/253877.htm.

[2] Jeffrey Lewis, “Donald Trump Is an Idiot Savant on Nuclear Policy,” Foreign Policy, March 7, 2016, accessed June 13, 2016, http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/03/07/donald-trump-is-an-idiot-savant-on-nuclear-policy/.

[3] Rodger Baker, “North Korea, the Outlier in U.S. Policy,” Stratfor Global Intelligence, January 19, 2016, accessed June 13, 2016, https://www.stratfor.com/weekly/north-korea-outlier-us-policy.

[4] Anna Fifield, “North Korea claims it could wipe out Manhattan with a hydrogen bomb,” The Washington Post, March 13, 2016, accessed June 13, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/north-korea-claims-it-could-wipe-out-manhattan-with-a-hydrogen-bomb/2016/03/13/3834cd54-e919-11e5-b0fd-073d5930a7b7_story.html.

[5] Ankit Panda, “Yes, North Korea’s Very Upset About New UN Security Council Sanctions,” The Diplomat, March 4, 2016, accessed June 13, 2016, http://thediplomat.com/2016/03/yes-north-koreas-very-upset-about-new-un-security-council-sanctions/.

[6] Van Jackson, “Nukes They Can Use? The Danger of North Korea Going Tactical,” 38 North, March 15, 2016, accessed June 13, 2016, http://38north.org/2016/03/vjackson031516/.

[7] Franz-Stefan Gady, “Largest Ever US-Korea Military Drill Focuses on Striking North Korea’s Leadership”, The Diplomat, March 8, 2016, accessed June 13, 2016, http://thediplomat.com/2016/03/largest-ever-us-korea-military-drill-focuses-on-striking-north-koreas-leadership/.

[8] Ankit Panda, “Meet North Korea’s New Multiple Launch Rocket System,” The Diplomat, March 7, 2015, accessed June 13, 2016, http://thediplomat.com/2016/03/meet-north-koreas-new-multiple-launch-rocket-system/

[9] Jeffrey Lewis, Twitter post, March 5, 2016, 7:38 p.m., https://twitter.com/ArmsControlWonk/status/706323004557373440.

[10] Strategic Plans Division Pakistan, Facebook post, August 24, 2015, 11:54 a.m., https://www.facebook.com/StrategicPlansDivisionPakistan/posts/487320088103190.

[11] John Schilling, “A New Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile for North Korea,” 38 North, April 25, 2016, accessed June 13, 2016, http://38north.org/2016/04/jschilling042516/

[12] Jeffrey Lewis, “Five Things You Need to Know about Kim Jong Un’s Photo Op with the Bomb,” 38 North, March 11, 2016, accessed June 13, 2016, http://38north.org/2016/03/jlewis031116/.

[13] Alastair Gale, “North Korea Threatens Nuclear Warhead, Ballistic Missile Tests,” The Wall Street Journal, March 14, 2016, accessed June 13, 2016, http://www.wsj.com/articles/north-korea-threatens-nuclear-warhead-ballistic-missile-tests-1458002582.

[14] Joel S. Wit & Sun Young Ahn, “North Korea’s Nuclear Futures: Technology and Strategy,” February, 2015, accessed June 13, 2016, 38 North, http://38north.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/NKNF_NK-Nuclear-Futures.pdf

[15] Shannon Tiezzi, “It’s Official: US, South Korea Begin Talks on THAAD,” The Diplomat, March 5, 2016, accessed June 13, 2016, http://thediplomat.com/2016/03/its-official-us-south-korea-begin-talks-on-thaad/

[16] “THAAD: Terminal High Altitude Area Defense,” Lockheed Martin, accessed June 13, 2016, http://www.lockheedmartin.com.au/us/products/thaad.html.

[17] Rod Lyon, “The Hard Truth About THAAD, South Korea and China,” The National Interest, February 23, 2016, accessed June 13, 2016, http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/the-hard-truth-about-thaad-south-korea-china-15295?page=show&utm_content=buffera4706&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter.com&utm_campaign=buffer

[18] Michael Elleman & Michael J. Zagurek Jr., “THAAD: What It Can and Can’t Do,” 38 North, March 10, 2016, http://38north.org/2016/03/thaad031016/

[19] Andrew Krepinevich & Jacob Cohn, “Rethinking the Apocalypse: Time for Bold Thinking About the Second Nuclear Age,” War on the Rocks, March 1, 2016, accessed June 13, 2016, http://warontherocks.com/2016/03/rethinking-the-apocalypse-time-for-bold-thinking-about-the-second-nuclear-age/

Asia To Test Trump's Geopolitical Assertiveness

United States | Political Risk | Country Risk | Mon Apr 03, 2017

BMI View: President Donald Trump's geopolitical assertiveness faces an early test in Asia, as he is due to host Chinese President Xi Jinping on April 6-7. Trade and security will dominate the agenda, amid growing protectionism in the US and rising tensions in Korea. Elsewhere, Trump will step up the fight against Islamic State. Meanwhile, relations with Russia will remain static for now, owing to substantial domestic opposition to Trump's desire for a major rapprochement with Russia.

US President Donald Trump's more assertive foreign policy faces an early test this spring, with Trump due to host his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping in Florida on April 6-7. During the 2016 election campaign, Trump adopted an extremely critical stance towards China, accusing it of unfair trade practices and currency manipulation, and criticising its assertiveness in militarising the South China Sea. In addition, Trump in early December briefly appeared to question the US's four-decade old 'One China' policy (i.e. of recognising the People's Republic of China as the sole Chinese government), when he broke with protocol by accepting a phone call from Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen. Given this backdrop, Trump's handling of China will be closely watched to determine whether his administration will be pragmatic internationally or retain a fiercely ideological bent. For his part, Xi will be unlikely to make any significant concessions towards the US. This is because Xi will not wish to be seen to be bowing to a new US president in 2017 in particular ahead of the Communist Party of China (CPC)'s quinquennial congress later this year.

Widening Gulf In Sino-US Relations Cannot Be Bridged Easily

The US is still the world's sole superpower, while China is the only country that could rival it on a global basis. The two countries are locked in a long-term struggle for mastery in the Asia-Pacific region ( see 'Sino-US Geopolitical Competition To Intensify In 2015-2020', March 26, 2015). Although the last three US presidents vowed a tougher China policy while campaigning, only to become much more pragmatic once in office, Trump appears more committed than his predecessors to addressing the trade imbalance. Below, we list the main issues dividing Washington and Beijing:

Trade: Trump has long bemoaned the US's USD347bn goods trade deficit (2016 figures) with China, which he sees as the clearest manifestation of 'unfair' Chinese trade practices. Trump blames this (and US corporations) for the loss of millions of manufacturing jobs overseas over the past generation or so. Trump also regards China as a 'currency manipulator' and has vowed to pressure it to make concessions to the US. Against this backdrop, we see a considerable risk that Trump will impose tariffs on key imports from China. The danger is that China will retaliate accordingly, leading to a step-by-step escalation to a bigger trade war ( see 'Trump Presidency: Three Scenarios For China', January 6, 2017).

Manufactured Goods Drive The Deficit

US Trade Deficit (L) And Surplus (R) With China In 2015 (USDbn). Service Data For 2014.

Meanwhile, Trump's decision to withdraw the US from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) has left the other participants (Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, and Vietnam) feeling somewhat adrift, as their governments had placed a great deal of political capital in the trade pact. The collapse of the TPP offers China the opportunity to reshape regional trade via its Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP).

From an economic perspective, we sense an opportunity for an announcement of a bilateral investment plan ( see 'Assessing The Potential For 'Win-Win' Trump Trade Deals', March 2, 2017) and for a timetable on further discussions on trade. A real upside surprise could be the announcement of a bilateral trade and investment treaty roadmap; Barack Obama started down this road and Trump favours bilateral deals.

Asian Defence And The South China Sea: During the election campaign, Trump signalled a reduced military commitment to Japan and South Korea, the US's two closest allies in East Asia. This was quietly welcomed by China, which has a territorial dispute with Japan over the Japanese-administered Senkaku (Diaoyu in Chinese) islands in the East China Sea. However, the Trump administration has since re-affirmed its commitment to Tokyo and Seoul. Trump's foreign policy team has also taken an increasingly critical stance towards China's militarisation of the South China Sea, through which a high proportion of East-West trade passes.

Overall, we believe that Trump will step up co-operation with regional allies to counter-balance China. The key risk is that greater aerial and naval activity on the part of China, the US, and Japan in the disputed regions will increase the risk of a collision or skirmish between rival aircraft or vessels. For example, in April 2001 a Chinese fighter jet collided with a US reconnaissance aircraft near China's Hainan island, forcing the American spyplane to make an emergency landing in Hainan. China detained the crew for almost two weeks, before releasing them after receiving a limited apology from the US. China is now far more powerful than it was in 2001, so a repeat of such incident may prove harder to resolve amicably.

The Greatest 'Game'

Asia - Geopolitical Alignments

Korean Peninsula: The Korean Peninsula is emerging as a key flashpoint for Trump, as the North presses ahead with its nuclear and missile programmes. Pyongyang may well carry out further weapons tests on April 15 or 25 (the 105th anniversary of the birth of its founder and the 85th anniversary of the establishment of its armed forces, respectively). Trump has repeatedly called on China to pressure North Korea into scrapping its nuclear programme, but Beijing has been reluctant to abandon Pyongyang outright, for fear of causing the latter's collapse, which would generate a massive refugee and security crisis affecting north-eastern China. In any case, we believe that China's influence over North Korea is limited.

South Korea's decision in Q1 2017 to receive the US's Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile system to counter the North has greatly angered China, which fears that THAAD's radar could be used to enhance US surveillance of China. Beijing has responded by imposing punitive measures on South Korean cosmetics, pop culture, and tourism. The situation is further complicated by South Korea's May 9 presidential election, which is likely to be won by the centre-left opposition candidate Moon Jae-in, who favours a more conciliatory stance towards the North. His ascent would put Washington at odds with Seoul at a time when the Trump administration is toughening its stance on Pyongyang and is even reportedly considering a military strike ( see 'Scenario: US Military Strike On North Korea', March 20, 2017). Although this is unlikely any time soon, the risk of US pre-emptive action will increase, as North Korea makes further progress in developing nuclear-tipped missiles capable of reaching the US. A US attack on North Korea could put Washington onto a collision course with Beijing, which is committed to the North's defence.

Taiwan: Another major concern of China is that Trump, backed by Japan, could increase US diplomatic and military support for Taiwan as a means of pressuring or containing China. Since January 2016, Taiwan has been governed by the independence-leaning Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) after eight years of a China-friendly leadership. Trump's acceptance of a congratulatory phone call from President Tsai Ing-wen in early December 2016 was not a spontaneous act of politeness, but apparently the result of months of Taiwanese lobbying. Trump later backtracked from comments suggesting that he would re-assess the US's 'One China' policy, but Beijing will remain wary of any attempt by Trump to use Taiwan or other geopolitically sensitive flashpoints as a means of pressuring it on trade issues.

Fight Against Islamic State To Be Stepped Up

Meanwhile, Trump is also stepping up the US-led air and ground campaign against Islamic State (IS) in the Middle East, as he regards fighting Islamist terrorism to be the number one security issue facing the US. The main US focus at present is supporting Iraqi forces in their offensive against Mosul, which has been controlled by Islamic State. Reports of rising civilian casualties in Iraq in early 2017 have raised speculation that US military commanders are being given greater freedom of action than under the previous Obama administration. The US has also steadily been raising the number of its troops in the conflict area with more than 5,300 now in Iraq and more than 500 in Syria, and there are reports that a few more thousand could follow soon. Moreover, Defense Secretary James Mattis stated in late March that US troops could remain in Iraq even after IS is defeated, presumably to prevent its reconstitution. That said, we do not expect Trump to deploy a tens-of-thousands-strong ground force (as he has previously hinted) against IS in 2017, unless there is a major terrorist attack in the US. Trump will most probably acquiesce to Russia playing a major role in Syria to defeat IS, in support of Syria's Assad regime.

Showdown In Mosul Under Way

Iraq - Control Of Territory

As regards Iran, Trump will take a cooler attitude towards the landmark July 2015 P5+1 nuclear deal, but will probably refrain from withdrawing from it outright, as its other signatories will warn of the risk that this could eventually lead to a military showdown with Tehran. In addition, it would be too risky for Trump to start a new confrontation with Iran at the same time that the US is fighting IS (which Tehran is also fighting against). However, once IS is defeated, Trump may gradually find ways to pressure Iran.

Russia Rapprochement To Be Delayed By Establishment Opposition

Elsewhere, Trump's often-stated desire to pursue a rapprochement with Russian President Vladimir Putin will prove harder to achieve, given that revelations of contacts between Trump campaign associates and the Russian embassy in 2016 have heightened congressional suspicions towards Moscow. We still believe that a Trump-Putin summit is possible over the coming months, but both sides will have tone down their expectations of what can be achieved ( see 'US-Russia Relations: Three Scenarios, 2017-2021', January 20, 2017). Even so, a more cordial atmosphere could pave the way for a modest improvement in US-Russia relations, which have sunk to their lowest point since the early 1980s.

However, we caution that the conflict in Eastern Ukraine remains susceptible to occasional flare-ups. Given this backdrop, it now appears unlikely that the EU will ease sanctions on Russia in July 2017, when it reviews them in June. This suggests that the sanctions will probably remain in place until early 2018 at least. In the meantime, if Putin grows increasingly frustrated with this deadlock, or seeks to drum up nationalist sentiment ahead of the Russian presidential election next March, then he could resort to more brinkmanship in Ukraine, or military posturing in the Baltic states or the Balkans. This would further postpone a rapprochement with the West.